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PREFACE 
The linkage model of IIASX's Food and Agriculture Program (FAP) can be 
described as an econometric world model which investigates the interaction of 
many national economies on a number of agricultural markets and one residual 
nonagricultural market. The model contains a number of policy parameters 
which can be determined by the national governments in order to improve the 
economic results. Given that  one can specify a goal function for every country, 
the IIASA linkage model can be thus viewed as a strategic game with the govern- 
ments of the various countries as players. 
In the paper some of the strategic aspects of the IIASA linkage model are 
investigated. Reasorls of analytic tractability made it advisable to study a radi- 
cally simplified version with only two commodities, food and nonfood, and with 
rather simple assumptions on government objectives such as short-run micimi- 
zation of the costs of agricultural policy. 
One of the major results is that under apparently weak restrictions on the 
parameters of our model it is an optimal policy for all countries to supply as 
much food as possible, which seems to contradict commonly held intuitions. Of 
course, one still has to determine whether the same result would hold for more 
complex models and whether the conditions would really be satisfied by 
econometrically specified model parameters. The basic reason for t h s  counter- 
intuitive result in our game model is that demand is specified by linear expendi- 
ture systems. We therefore suggest alternative demand specifications, which 
would avoid the difficulties of linear expenditure systems. 
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Strategic Aspects of IIASA's Food and Agriculture Model 
One of the major research efforts of IIASA's Food and Agriculture Program 
is to develop an  econometric world model which describes the interaction of 
many national economies on a number of agricultural markets and one residual 
nonagricultural market (see Rabar, 1979). The model has not yet been com- 
pleted, but its basic structure has been fixed and several national subsystems 
have been estimated (see, for instance, Keyzer, 1980, Csaki, 1979, Parikh, 1977 
and Fischer and Frohberg, 1980). The model contains a number of policy 
parameters which can be used in order to  study the consequences of various 
forms of government intervention. Obviously, the interaction of many govern- 
ments who pursue different goals causes a strategic problem whch  -- a t  least in 
principle - should be amenable to game theoretic analysis. 
The authors of this paper, who did not participate in the development of 
IIASA's food and agriculture model, wanted to study its strategic structure. Rea- 
sons of analytic tractability make it advisable to investigate a radically 
simplified version with only two commodities, food and nonfood. This can be 
done without losmg relevant structural properties. The analysis of strategic 
interaction makes it necessary to complement the model by governmental goal 
functions and constraints on governmental action. In a realistic model one 
might want to specify a M e r e n t  goal function for every country, depending on a 
large variety of goal variables. We feel that the time is not yet ripe to take this 
approach. It seems to be better to aim at  basic strategic insights with the help 
of very simple assumptions on government objectives such as the short-run 
minimization of the costs of agricultural policy for each country. 
The analysis of our simplified models ylelds the result that under 
apparently weak restrictions on the parameters it is an optimal policy for all 
countries ' to  supply as much food as possible. Ths  contradicts commonly held 
intuitions. Of course, one still has to determine whether the same result holds 
for more complex models and whether the conditions will be really satisfied by 
econometrically specifled model parameters. The basic reason for our counter- 
intuitive result can be seen in the fact that in our model demand is specfied by 
linear expenditure systems. As we shall see, in our model linear expenditure 
systems have the consequence that in most cases an individual country's reve- 
nue obtained by production is always increased by an increase of supply. The 
same does not hold for the market as a whole, total revenue is generally 
decreased by an increase of total supply. However, if the supply of the other 
countries is kept constant, it pays to expand one's own supply as far as possible. 
IIASA's food and agriculture model is colloquially referred to as a linkage 
model. We shall employ the same term for the two commodity versions investi- 
gated here. In order to exhibit the basic facts in the simplest possible way, we 
shall first look at a special case where food stocks are neglected and domestic 
prices are  assumed to be equal to international prices. Later we shall abolish 
these restrictions. Finally, we shall sug'gest alternative demand specifications 
whch avoid the difficulties of linear expenditure systems. 
1. A Special Linkage Model 
The models investigated here contain two markets, a food market and a 
nonfood market. Variables related to the food market will be denoted by small 
Latin characters, whereas corresponding capital Latin letters will be used for 
nonfood variables. We assume that there are n countries 1, ..., n. Subindices 
refer to the number of the country. We employ the following notation: 
p food price 
P nonfood price 
r food/nonfood price ratio ( r=p /  P) 
di domestic food demand in country i 
si domestic food supply in country i 
Di domestic nonfood demand in country i 
S, domestic nonfood supply in country i 
Yi monetary national income of country i 
El monetary national expenditures of country i (national absorption) 
In IIASA's food and agriculture model the nonfood supply S, is predetermined by 
production decisions in the previous period and therefore can be taken as con- 
stant for the purpose of short-term analysis. We shall treat total food supply s, 
as country i's policy variable whlch can be chosen withln given lower and upper 
bounds: 
4 S s, SSi for i = 1, ..., n 
Excess demands z, and Zi for country i are defined as follows: 
The excess demands zi and Z1 must satisfy the following market clearing condi- 
tions: 
In IIASA's food and agriculture model trade surpluses and deficits are deter- 
mined exogenously by appropriate readjustment of planned trade surpluses and 
deficits. Accordingly, we assume that  a vector of real trade deficits Ki expressed 
in terms of nonfood is exogenously given: 
Ki = rzi + Zi for i = 1, ..., n (6) 
In order to assure the consistency with (4) and (5) trade deficits must be fixed in 
such a way that  the following equation holds: 
Moreover, we have to impose a further restriction on the vector of Ki's to make 
sure that we obtain a positive price ratio\p/ P and demands di and Di withln the 
region where the linear expenditure system to be introduced later makes sense: 
K~ > D: - si for i= I ,  ..., n (8) 
The reason why we need this condition wlll become apparent in section 2. Since 
the right-hand side of (8) is negative in view of con&tion (15) to be introduced 
below, this means that (8) excludes surpluses whlch are excessively large. Since 
we permit trade surpluses and deflcits, national income 
Y, = sip + s i p  
and total expenditures 
are not equal to each other. The following relationshp holds: 
In our view it would be preferable to determine trade deficits endogenously and, 
as we shall see later,  t h s  can be done easily with the help of national absorption 
functions as  they are  used in monetary international trade theory. For the time 
be~ng  we consider the Ki's a s  exogenously fixed in order to conform to the IIASA 
model in its present form. Demand is described by the following linear expendi- 
ture system: 
tori = 1, ..., n. The parameters df and D; are assumed to be non-negative. They 
have the interpretation of minimum demands which are to be satisfied indepen- 
dent of prices and income. The constants ai satisfy 0 < ai < 1 for i = 1, ..., n.  In 
game models it is important to obtain reasonable values for the variables for all 
choices of the strategic parameters and not only in equilibrium. Therefore, we 
impose the following restrictions: 
q > df for i = !, ..., n (14) 
S, > DP for i = I ,  ..., n (15) 
Conditions (14) and (15) exclude situations which make it impossible to buy the 
minimum demands d; and D:. Equations (12) and (13) show that total monetary 
demand dip+DiP equals monetary national expenditures Ei. 
We assume that the share of farm incomes Fi in total income Yi is protected 
by a parity policy expressed by the following equation: 
Fi = fiYi for i = 1, ..., n (16) 
where the fils are positive constants smaller than one. In the context of our 
short-run strategic analysis we look a t  (16) as a constraint on government policy 
rather than a result of political decisions. For our purpose it is not important in 
which way the governments operate to satisfy this constraint. One may think of 
direct subsidies.or subsidized domestic producers' prices. In any case, the 
difference between the farm incomes Fi and the value of domestic food produc- 
tion sip has to be covered by government expenditures. We assume that  govern- 
ments want to minimize the costs of agricultural policy or, equivalently, to max- 
imize the revenue of agricultural policy. In the framework of a model which is 
homogeneous of degree 0 in prices, it is natural to suppose that  governments 
are  concerned with real revenues rather than monetary revenues. Therefore, 
we shall express the gains Hi of agricultural policy in nonfood terms: 
Hi = [psi - fiYi]/ P for i = 1, ..., n (17) 
It is, of course, possible that for some corntries Hi is positive. In this case agri- 
cultural policies are used in order to finance government expenditures for other 
purposes. The farm income parity constraint (16) makes sense here, too, since 
taxation of farm incomes must be limited somewhere by the political considera- 
tion of farm interests. 
The model can now be looked upon as a game where the governments of the 
countries 1, ..., n are the players. Player i's strategy is the food supply quantity si 
whlch must be chosen in the interval (1). For every strategy combination s = 
(s ,,..., si) we can compute the market clearing price ratio r = p / P .  Moreover, 
demand quantities, real national incomes Yi/ P and governments' payoffs Hi can 
be determined. In t h s  way we receive a payof7 vector 
with the governments' payoffs Hi(s) resulting from the strategy vector s = 
(s,, ..., s,) as components. Thereby, we have specified a game in normal form with 
the pure strategy sets (1) and the payoff function H .  In the next section we shall 
show that the game has a uniquely determined equilibrium point at s = 
3 = 3,  ,...,3 ,) under reasonable additional restrictions on the parameters s, and 
diO. 
2. Analysis of the Special Linkage Model 
An immediate consequence of (12) and (13) is: 
a i  D~-D: 
r = e= -.  for i = 1, ..., n P l-ai di-d: 
(6) is equivalent to: 
(2) and (3) together with (20) yleld: 
D, - D: = Ki + Si - D: - r(di - si) 
The right-hand side of (22) can be substituted for Di - D: in (19): 
In view of di = si + zi we obtain 
With the help of the market clearing condition (4) the n equations (26) can be 
summed up as follows: 
n 
r['f (1-ai)(si - df)] = q ( ~ ~  + Si - D:) 
i = l  i= 1 
Condition (8) on the trade deficits Ki has the consequence that the right-hand 
side of (27) is positive. The coefficient of r in (27) is positive in view of (14). 
Therefore, we obtain a positive price ratio r: 
Equation (28) shows that an increase of country i's supply decreases the 
food/nonfood price ratio r if the supplies of the other countries are kept con- 
stant. The nominator does not depend on the food supplies and the denominator 
is a linear function of the si where the coemcient 1 - a, is positive. It can be 
seen that the influence of the trade deficits Ki on r would vanish if all ai 's were 
equal. This is due to (7). However, for unequal coefficients ai the distribution of 
trade deficits and surpluses influences the price ratio r .  
For our purposes it is not necessary to  derive explicitly formulae for the 
demand quantities di and Di. But it is worthwhile to  show how conditions (8) 
secure that the demand quantities di and Di surpass the corresponding 
minimum demands dp and D?. Equation (11) can be rewritten as follows: 
It is sufficient to show that  the expenditures are hlgh enough to cover the costs 
of the minimum demands d: and D:. T b s  means that  the inequalities dj  > d/ 
and Di > D: are  satisfied if we have 
(1) and (14) have the consequence that  q > d4 holds. Therefore, condition (8) 
secures the validity of (30). 
In view of 
the payoff Hi can be written as follows 
We look a t  our model as a noncooperative game in normal form. The notion of 
an  equilibrium point in pure strategies is a natural solution concept for non- 
cooperative games. In our case a n  equilibrium point in pure strategies can be 
described as a strategy combination s' = (s; ,..., s@ such that for i = 1, ..., n the fol- 
lowing condition is satisfied: 
H,(s') = max ~ ~ ( s ; ,  . . . , S ~ ~ , S ~ , S ~ + ~ ,  . . . , s,') 
s,ssiKsi 
If every country i expects that  all other countries j choose their equilibrium sup- 
ply quantities s:, then i t  can not do anythmg better  than to choose s:. 
As we shall see, for reasonable parameter constellations our model has a 
- 
uniquely determined equilibrium point in pure strategies, namely 3 = el,. .  ,s,). 
Moreover, in these cases the selection of the maximum supplySi is a dominant 
strategy for every country i in the sense that the selection of -Sj will be best 
whatever the other countries do. The additional requirement under w hch  this 
result holds is the following one: 
2 (1 - aj)S > 2(1 - aj)dp for i = 1. .... n 
j = l .  j f i  j= 1 
In order to interpret conhtion (34), it is useful to look a t  the special case where 
all ails are equal. Then condition (34) assumes the following form: 
5 q > 2 d p  for i = I. .... n 
j = l .  j+i J=l 
(35) requires that the minimum productions, of any collection of n-1 countries 
is sufficient to cover the minimum demands of all n countries. In view of the 
Pact that minimum demands probably should be thought of as relatively small 
compared to minimum supplies, t h s  seems to be a mild restriction. Obviously, 
the same can be said for (34) in the case of unequal ai's which are  not too 
different Prom each other. 
Theorem: Under condition (34) the game model described in section 1 has one 
and only one equilibrium point in pure strategies, namely 3 = e l , . . . s n ) .  More- 
over, under this conditionSi is a dominant strategy in the sense that 
holds for every s = (s,, .. . ,s,) with ~ ~ $ 3 ~ .  
Proof: In order to show that Si is dominant, we prove that the partial derivative 
of Hi(s) with respect to si is positive everywhere. (32) shows that the sign of this 
de~ivative is the same as that of the partial derivative of sir with respect to si. 
Define 
It follows by (28) that we have 
We obtain 
The right-hand side of (40) is positive for 
n 
C (1 - ails] > Y 
] = I .  j t i  
This is always true because of condition (34). Consequently, the partial deriva- 
tive of Hi(s) with respect to  si is always positive and the maximal payoff is 
achieved a t  Bi regardless of the  strategies of the other players. 
Remark: Equation (40) shows that  the sign of the partial derivative of Hi(s) with 
respect to si does not depend on si. If condition (34) is not satisfied, the partial 
derivative may be positive, negative or zero. I f  a player i a t  an equilibrium point 
has a strategy si with 3 < si < Bi, then the partial derivative of his payoff with 
respect to  his supply must be zero at the equilibrium point and his payoff 
obtained against the equilibrium strategies of the others does not depend on his 
own supply. I t  is clear that  such equilibrium points must be expected to be very 
unstable. An equilibrium point s = (sl, . .  .,sn) where every player i = 1 ,..., n has a 
positive incentive to choose his equlibriurn supply requires either Si =3i or si = 
4. 
As we have seen, under condition (34) the real national food revenue sir is 
an increasing function of si if the food supplies of the other countries are  kept 
constant. This may be described by saying that demand for an individual 
country's food supply is elastic. A similar statement does not hold for the 
market  as a whole. In order to see this, we look a t  the special case where the 
ails are  all equal to the same constant a .  Deflne 
In the case of equal ails total real food revenue can be written as follows 
We obtain 
This shows that the total real food revenue is a decreasing function of total food 
supply e. 
3. A more general linkage model 
The special linkage model can be generalized by the introduction of buffer 
stocks and of differences between domestic prices and world market prices and 
between producers' and consumers' prices. Price differences of t h s  kind may be 
introduced by tariffs, taxes and subsidies. It is also possible to assume that a 
government directly controls domestic prices. For given policies of other coun- 
tries it does not matter  too much in whch way domestic prices are controlled, 
provided the government has sufficient degrees of freedom in order to achieve 
given targets. In a game theoretic context, however, the specific mode of 
government intervention may be of great importance for the economic results 
achieved in equilibrium. Thus a world in which differences between domestic 
prices and world market prices are created by tariffs and a world in whch such 
dflerences are due to directly controlled prices may lead to quite different 
equilibrium situations. l h s  is due to the fact that for given foreign domestic 
prices one country's policies affect the other countries' imports and exports in 
another way than for given foreign tariffs. This poses interesting research ques- 
tions concerning the comparison of various institutional schemes which can be 
explored in the framework of our models. Ths task will not be pursued within 
t h s  paper, but it may be a fruitful subject of further investigation. 
In order to create a framework which permits more institutional details, we 
introduce the following variables: 
Q domestic producers' food price in country i 
Qi domestic producers' nonfood price in country i 
pi domestic consumers' food price in country i 
Pi domestic consumers' nonfood price in country i 
Bt food buffer stock in country i 
bi change of country i's food buffer stock 
One may want to look at an institutional setup where the differences of domestic 
and international prices and of producers' and consumers' prices are controlled 
by proportional tariffs, proportional indirect taxes and/or subsidies. Thls leads 
to  relationships of the following kind: 
for i = 1, ..., n. The ai, Ai, g, and Gi are positive policy parameters which may be 
restricted by upper and lower bounds. We shall not look at the question of how 
these parameters should be optimally selected. Instead of this we shall treat 
them as exogenously fixed in order to generalize the game model of section 1 to  
the enlarged framework. As before we shall look at the food supplies si a s  stra- 
tegic variables, but in addition to  t h s  we shall also permit the buffer stock 
changes bi to  be selected strategically. Ths  means that  player i's strategy is a 
pair (si,bi) where si is restricted to the interval (1) and the bi has to be chosen in 
such a way that the following inequality holds: 
O S B ~  + b, s B i  for i = 1, ..., n (50) 
The constant Bi may be interpreted as country i's storage capacity for food. In 
order to avoid situations where net supply after the reduction of storage change 
does not cover minimurn demand, we strengthen condition (14) in the following 
way: 
s, > > df + B, for i = 1 ,  ... , n  (51) 
Wherever we do not say anythng to the contrary, we shall continue to employ 
the definitions of section 1. Thus national income Yi will be defined as in (9) in 
terms of international prices. However, in some respect the enlarged frame- 
work makes it necessary to adapt previous definitions. Excess demands zi for 
food is redefined as follows: 
z, = di + bi - si for i = 1, ..., n (52) 
Equations (3), (4) and (5) remain unchanged. As in section 1 the price ratio p /  P 
is denoted by r .  The definition of Ki and the restrictions on the vector of Kiss 
remain the same, too. However, total national expenditures Ei now must be 
defined in terms of domestic consumers' prices. Instead of (10) we obtain 
In ( l l ) ,  however, Ei must be evaluated in terms of international prices. There- 
fore, (1 1) must now be expressed as follows: 
The expenditure system (12) and (13) must be rewritten by inserting domestic 
consumers' prices pi and Pi in ( 12) and (13): 
The parity rule (16) now assumes the following form: 
It is reasonable to tie farm incomes to national income evaluated in producers' 
prices. 
The introduction of buffer stocks poses a problem of inventory evaluation. 
In this respect we shall simply assume that the evaluation of Bi is just taken over 
from the past and that each unit of bi is evaluated a t  a constant proportion hi of 
the world market price p. With t h s  kind of inventory evaluation the gains 
obtained by agricultural policy can be written as follows: 
We may t h n k  of the government as buying all food production si at  producers' 
price gi and adjusting the difference between gisi and Fi by appropriate taxes or 
subsidies. Agricultural production s, is then partially sold on the domestic food 
market which yields dg,, and partially put on the buffer stock whch yields an 
increase of inventory value of biAip. Excess demand zi has to be traded at  the 
world market price p. In this way it can be seen that (58) correctly describes 
the gains from agricultural policy. Of course, it must be pointed out that 
indirect effects on gains from nonfood tariff policies are not considered in the 
payoff function. Ths is done intentionally, since we take the point of view that 
government activity is not completely integrated. Those authorities who Ax agri- 
cultural policies are held responsible only for the gains or losses by agricultural 
policy and therefore they are not motivated by indirect effects. Of course, it 
would be possible to look a t  different payotf functions based on another view of 
government motivation. But t h s  will not be done here. 
In a long run strategic analysis inventory evaluation would not be intro- 
duced as a behavioral rule. Instead of this the way in which the inventory should 
be evaluated would be determined by the strategic analysis of future periods. 
Since we restrict our intention to short-run strategic analysis, we have to rely on 
some plausible inventory evaluation rule. Of course, other such rules could be 
considered as part of the payoff function and investigated in the same way. 
Inventory evaluation rules can be thought of as limited rationality methods 
to take account of long run effects. On the other hand, one may take the point 
of view that the deviations from perfect rationality incorporated in the payoff 
function are a reflection of the way in which the political public evaluates the 
performance of agricultural policy. The myopic goal orientation may be more 
seen as related to a short-run bias of the political public than to a lack of insight 
in the dynamic structure as far as the authorities are concerned. If t h s  is taken 
into account, it becomes doubtful whether a long run strategic analysis could 
really be expected to yield more realistic results than a short run strategic 
analysis. 
In the next section we shall indicate how the more general linkage model 
can be analyzed in the same way as the model of section 1. 
4. Analysis of the more general linkage model 
We shall proceed in a similar way as in section 2. Define 
for i = 1, ..., n 
With the help of (46) and (47) we obtain 
ai 
ri = T for i = 1, ..., n 
A, 
Analogously to (19) in section 2 we obtain 
The following equation corresponds to (22): 
After inserting the right-hand side of (62) for Di - DP in (61) we receive an equa- 
tion which can be rewritten in the following form: 
- 
a iAi /  ai 
- Ki + si - D:] for i = I ,  ..., n 1 + ai (Ai /  ai - 1)' 
With the help of the market clearing condition (4) we receive 
In the same way as in section 2 it can be seen that under our assumptions 
on the parameters r is always positive and that the demand di and Di exceed the 
corresponding minimum demands di and D:. The payoff function Hi can be writ- 
ten as follows: 
(61) and (62) yield: 
Ai Ai [ ( I  - ai)dp + ai---(si - bJ]r + at---(Ki + Si-  DP) 
dl = ai a i A 
The discussion of the influence of si and bi on Hi becomes easy if an assumption 
on the parameters is added to the model, which probably is not too unrealistic: 
a i >  hi>figiai  f o r i  = 1, ..., n (68) 
Highly industr idzed food exporters like the U.S.A. have relatively small values 
of Pi and it is reasonable to suppose that for them hi >figiai is satisfied. Under- 
developed countries with relatively h g h  values of f i  may also have h g h  values of 
hi since for them the storage of food is important to secure future food supply. 
ai > hi holds unless domestic consumers' food prices are highly subsidized. 
We f i s t  observe that  r and di depend on the net supplies si - bi only. If t h s  
net supply is kept fixed, an increase of si will always increase Hi if (68) is 
satisfied. It follows that under t h s  condition, a country will produce as much as 
possible as long as its storage capacity is not yet exhausted. 
Now suppose that si is kept Axed and bi is increased. The influence of a 
change of this kind depends only on the partial derivative of (si - bi)r with 
respect to bi. The coefficient of (s,-bi)r in Hi is positive if we have 
In (69) the expression of 1- ai is multiplied by a fraction smaller than 1. There- 
fore, (69) holds for  ai > hi. Consequently, the sign of the partial derivative of Hi 
with respect to bi with Si kept constant will be the same as that  of (si - bi)r with 
respect to bi for si kept constant if (68) holds. 
The influence of bi on (si - bi)r can be investigated in a way similar to the 
influence of si on sir in section 1. It is clear that a condition similar to (34) can 
be written down whch  secures that (si - bi)r is increased, if si - bi is increased or 
conversely if bi is decreased. In the special case A i l  ai = 1 for i = 1, ..., n this con- 
dition reduces to an inequahty whch is very similar to (34). The only difference 
is that djo on the right-hand side is replaced by df + Bi. Obviously, the new con- 
dition can be interpreted in the same way as (34). If Ai/ai is near to 1 
for  i = 1, ..., n, it is also plausible to assume that (si - bi)r is increased if si - bi is 
increased. If t h s  is the case and (68) holds, it will pay to produce as much as 
possible and to sell all the food stock. Thus it is fair to say that for reasonable 
parameter constellations esseritially the same result as in the special linkage 
model is obtained here, too. @,,-Dl) is a dominant strategy of any country i = 
1, ..., n. T h s  means that it pays to produce as much as possible and to sell the 
whole b d e r  stock regardless of what the other countries do. 
Of course, stronger restrictions on the parameters than in the special link- 
age model are  needed here in order to produce the result. However, t h s  does 
not really matter as long as those cases which are withn the restrictions are the 
typical ones. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that producing as much as possi- 
ble and selllng everything is a dominant strategy for those players for whom (68) 
holds if the condition corresponding to  (34) is satisfied even if (68) does not hold 
for some other players. 
5. Ehdogenous determination of trade balances 
As we have said already in section 1, in our view i t  would be preferable to  
determine trade deficits and surpluses endogenously. This can be done with the 
help of absorption functions as they are  commonly used in monetary interna- 
tional trade theory. In order to  explain the approach w hch  we are  going to pro- 
pose, we want t o  rely on the simpler model of section 1, since it will be quite 
clear how the idea can be generalized to  more complicated models. The absorp- 
tion function for country i connects national expenditures Ei to  national income 
Y,: 
where pi and ei are^ positive constants with ei < 1 for i = 1 ,  ..., n. In the context of 
a dynamic model Ei may be determined by past national incomes and/or expen- 
ditures. Monetary trade deficits Kip are  determined endogenously by the system 
of absorption functions. 
The linear expen&ture system (12) and (13) together with (70) implies 
Dip = [ ( I  - ai)eisi - ( 1  - ai)dF]p + [ a i ~ P  + (1  - ai)eiSi]P + (1  - ai)& (72) 
In view of (4) and (5) we have 
(71), (72), (73) and (74) yleld 
For given strategies s,, ..., sn equations (75) and (76) determine p and P. Actually 
at  t h s  point one would have to discuss the problem under whch conditions the 
system (75) and (76) is solvable and yields positive values for p and P. We do not 
want to discuss this question here, since it is not our intention to explore the 
modified model of section 1 in greater detail. 
With the help of p and P we can compute Yi by (9) and then Ei by (70). 
Finally, we derive the trade deficits Ki with the help of (11). 
Our investigation of the modified model whch we shall not report on here 
has lead us to conclusions whch are similar to those reached for the unmodified 
model of section 1. Therefore,we thmk that more changes than the introduction 
of endogenous trade balances by absorption functions are needed in order to 
deslgn models whose strategic analysis yield less counterintuitive results. 
The introduction of absorption functions (70) destroys the homogeneity of 
the system with respect to prices. Not only the price ratio r = p /  P but also the 
nominal prices p and P are now determined by the system. This is less objec- 
tionable than one may thnk ,  since the model will still be "homogeneous in the 
long run" if ti depends homogeneously on past national incomes and/or expendi- 
tures. "Homogeneity in the long run" means that for all our periods together 
prices are only determined up to a constant (factor). 
The determination of trade balances with the help of an absorption 
approach can be modeled in a much simpler way if one is willing to assume that 
the adjustment processes which acheve the equality of demand and supply are 
mainly determined by the nonfood sector. It is reasonable to suppose that the 
adjustments will be quicker there than in the agricultural sector. The idea of 
nonfood dominance in the absorption approach can be modeled by an absorp- 
tion function of the following kind: 
This equation is analogous to (70) with the only difference that the absorption 
hypothesis is now restricted to the nonfood sector. Summation of equations (77) 
together with the market clearing condition (5) yields the following formula for 
P : 
With the help of (78) the demands Di can be computed by (77). If we divide each 
of the equation (13) by 1 - ai and sum up over i, we obtain 
Since the sum of all Ei is nothng other than the sum of all Yi, this ylelds 
C (si - df) 
i = l  
Finally, the di8s can be determined by the help of (12) and the Ki can be com- 
puted by (2), (3) and (6). 
8. A n  alternative approach to demand 
Linear expenditure systems have very good analytical properties and it is 
hard to And other specifications of demand whch are as flexible and as easy to 
handle. Unfortunately, we have to look for somethng else if we want to produce 
a more meaningful strategic analysis. 
Linear demand functions would be an obvious possibility. One could specify 
a food demand function where di depends linearly on r = p / P .  Such a food 
demand function could be derived from utility functions whch are additively 
composed of a quadratic utility from food and a linear utility from nonfood. On 
the one hand, one would obtain good analytic properties, but on the other hand 
one would have to accept the undesirable property that food expenditures do 
not depend on income at  all, but only on relative prices. One may have, of 
course, an influence of past incomes on the parameters of the linear demand 
functions for food. Since time periods in the IIASA model are relatively long (1 
year), this does not seem to be very recommendable. 
One can retain some of the advantages of the linear demand functions for 
food if it is complemented by a linear dependence on nonfood demand Di: 
The coefficients ui, vi and wi are assumed to be positive. This demand relation- 
ship involves the following demand functions: 
for i = 1, ..., n. A utility interpretation can be given for such demand fiinctions, 
but t h s  shall not be done here. It can be seen immediately by (82) that real 
food expenditures dir go to zero with decreasing r whch is not the case for 
linear expenditure functions. 
It is worth pointing out another difference to linear expenditure systems. 
Consider the share of food expenditures dip/ Ei. For the linear expenditure sys- 
tem we obtain: 
For high relative prices of food the first term on the right-hand side of (84) is 
positive. ' h s  has the consequence that for h g h  relative prices of food, the food 
expenditure share is a decreasing function of total expenditures. For 
sufaciently low relative prices of food, however, the food expenditure share is an 
increasing function of total expenditures. It would be much more plausible to 
have an opposite effect of low and h g h  relative prices. For (82) the food expen- 
diture share in total expenditures is as follows: 
It can be seen immediately that the first term which is influenced by Ei is posi- 
tive for low relative food prices and negative for h ~ g h  relative food prices. For 
low relative prices of food the expenditure share of food is a decreasing function 
of Ei, the opposite relationship can only hold for sufficiently h g h  relative food 
prices r .  
The demand relationshp (81) together with the simplified absorption 
approach (77) produces an analytically well behaved system in which the payoff 
functions considered in t h s  paper are quadratic in the strategic variables si and 
bi. The detgiled exploration of this moMed  model cannot be presented here. 
We plan to do t h s  in a separate report. 
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